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Summary 
This paper investigates the impact of EU Cohesion Policy on citizens’ identification with Europe. To 
do so, an original and representative survey was conducted in 17 regions across 12 EU member 
states, which vary considerably with regard to allocations from EU Cohesion Policy and attitudes to 
the EU. We estimate the impact of awareness about the EU Funds, perceived benefits and exposure 
to publicity on the likelihood that a respondent develops a European identity. We adopt a novel 
gradual approach to measuring EU identity by considering various stages in the shift from a sole 
identification with one’s home country to a mixed national-European identity and then a sole 
identification with Europe. Multilevel models allow us to control for well-known individual drivers of 
identification with Europe, such as political interest, trust in EU institutions, or attachment to 
Europe, as well as regional/national factors, such as actual Cohesion Policy allocations as well as 
frequency, saliency and tone of national and regional media coverage of Cohesion Policy. We find 
that knowledge of Cohesion Policy matters for developing a European identity, and indeed 
awareness of the Cohesion Fund matters more than awareness of the European Regional 
Development Fund or the European Social Fund. Further, exposure to EU publicity of funded 
projects also increases the likelihood of developing a Europeanised identity.  Wider theoretical and 
policy implications are discussed in the context of the debate on the post-2020 EU budget and 
Cohesion policy reform.
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1.! Introduction 
 
There is increasing recognition of the importance of a shared European identity for the 
development and sustainability of the European Union (EU) as a political regime (Kaina and 
Karolewski 2013; Bellucci et al. 2012). The impact of identity politics on the EU’s political landscape 
is clear from the rise of populist and anti-EU political parties across Europe in the post crisis era and 
their successful exploitation of cultural and immigration fears in particular (Hutter et al. 2016). 
Among the most striking examples is the UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU where concerns 
about the undermining of British identity by the EU and the degree of identification with Europe 
were strong determinants of how people voted (Hobolt 2016; Curtice 2017).  Research shows that 
identification with Europe is a key driver of citizens’ political support for the EU (Hooghe	 2005;	
Klingeren	et	al.	2013;	Serricchio	et	al.	2013) and EU policy responses to the crisis (Verhaegen 2017). 
The rise of European identity politics is not only a political game-changer. It has also challenged the 
assumptions of traditional European integration theories with their emphasis on the functional and 
economic determinants of integration, and led to new post-functional theories of integration with 
identity-based factors at their core (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hutter et al. 2016; Risse and Borzel 
2018).  
If European identity has become a driver of European integration outcomes, a critical question is 
what accounts for European citizens’ identification with the EU? This question has produced a vast 
and valuable body of work examining how and why citizens transfer their allegiance to the EU, 
emphasising a combination of top-down institutional factors and bottom-up individual-level 
characteristics of citizens (for reviews, see Favell et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012; Kaina and 
Karolewski 2013).  While scholarship on collective identity in the EU has a long tradition, there 
remains a lack of robust knowledge about how specific EU policies impact on citizens’ European 
identity especially at the subnational level.  The existing literature has mainly focused on the role of 
economic and monetary union, or policies that facilitate mobility and transnational social 
interactions (e.g. the Single Market or Erasmus) but has paid limited attention to other EU policies. 
In this article, we seek to add to the literature on the determinants of European identity by 
investigating the impact of EU Cohesion Policy. Cohesion Policy is ideally placed to bring the EU 
closer to citizens and contribute to European identity because it is the most explicit expression of 
EU solidarity through a redistributive programme of investment focused on the less developed 
countries and regions of the EU. Further, it has highly visible impacts on people’s daily lives through 
infrastructure projects, support for businesses and training for people across the EU. Indeed, it is a 
funding requirement to publicise the funding, projects and achievements to stakeholders and the 
wider public to increase awareness about the opportunities and benefits. With its pioneering 
multilevel governance model and partnership principle, Cohesion Policy is also credited with 
encouraging the participation and empowerment of subnational governments and stakeholders in 
regional development policies and EU policy implementation more generally, as well as 
encouraging local and civic engagement at all levels.   
Yet, there are unanswered questions about the extent of public awareness, knowledge and 
perceived benefits of Cohesion Policy, and whether this translates into identification with the EU 
across regions and localities. The limited available literature suggest that EU funding can have a 
direct or moderating effect on attitudes to the EU (Osterloh 2011; Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015) but 
no impact on European identity (Verhaegen et al. 2014). However, these studies focus on the 
impact of objective funding allocations and do not consider the role of subjective perceptions of 
Cohesion Policy owing to the lack of data. The present study addresses exactly this gap by including 
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additional factors relating to citizens perception of Cohesion Policy drawing on an original survey 
dataset of 8,500 citizens in 17 EU regions.  
The paper is organised as follows. The first section reviews the existing literature on EU identity and 
Cohesion Policy before setting out the theoretical expectations. The second section presents the 
data and methodology. The findings are then presented, highlighting sources of Cohesion Policy 
awareness as well as the impact of awareness and perceived benefits on European identity. Wider 
theoretical and policy implications are discussed in the conclusion.  
 
2.! Cohesion Policy and European Identity: Theory And Hypotheses 
 
While scholarship on European identity has grown rapidly over recent decades, research on the role 
of EU Cohesion Policy in promoting European identity remains uncharted academic terrain. There 
are several quantitative studies assessing the impact of Cohesion Policy funding on citizens’ support 
for the EU but very limited research on the impact on European identity. Nor are there any 
qualitative studies explicitly assessing the impact of Cohesion Policy on identity.  
A qualitative study of European identity examined the everyday narratives of Europe used by 
families living in border areas through focus groups and examined the role of Cohesion Policy 
indirectly through the use of EU-funded project images (Armbruster et al. 2003; Meinhoff 2003). 
Photos of EU-funded cross-border infrastructure investments (e.g. buildings, roads, waste 
treatment plants with the EU plaque) were shown to the focus group participants as visual triggers 
to prompt discussion about the EU. The expectation was that the photos would prompt reactions 
and emotions about the role of Europe in their daily lives. However, European identity narratives 
were not triggered. Rather, the photos were unrecognized, ignored or interpreted as local issues. It 
is worth noting that fieldwork took place in 2000 before the accession of some of the (Eastern 
countries) covered in the research. It is therefore possible that European identities have changed in 
the interim period, not least because of major increases in investment to the Eastern side of the 
border and because of the need for a long-term perspective to measure collective identification 
processes. Further, some of the cases represented hard tests for collective identity formation (e.g. 
on the German-Polish border) because of historically high levels of territorial conflict and wide 
socio-economic disparities that militate against the development of a shared identity.  
The quantitative literature on European identity has also not paid significant attention to Cohesion 
Policy. One exception is a study by Verhaegen et al. (2014) on the economic determinants of both 
European identity and political support for the EU, based on analysis of Eurobarometer survey data 
during 2011. Contrary to expectations, the study did not find a significant relationship between EU 
Structural Fund allocations (or net payments from the EU budget) at the country level and the 
strength of citizens’ European identity, although other perceived economic benefits for the country 
and individuals did impact positively on European identification. As noted, the study did not 
estimate the impact of perceived benefits from EU Structural Funds among citizens because the 
Eurobarometer data used does not include such questions.  
By contrast, there are several quantitative studies examining the impact of Cohesion Policy 
transfers on political support for the EU using Eurobarometer data on public opinion and financial 
allocations at regional level, albeit providing conflicting conclusions.  Duch and Taylor (1997) found 
that Cohesion Policy funding did not generate support for European integration in the early 1980s. 
By contrast, studies of the impact of Structural Funds on public support for the EU in the late 90s, 
following a sizeable increase in the structural funds budget, have found a statistically significant and 
positive effect (Brinegar et al. 2004; Osterloh 2011). In addition, Osterloh (2011) found that citizens’ 
awareness translated into higher public support for the EU particularly among direct beneficiaries of 
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EU funds. Publicity and information sources of awareness (such as TV, information signs) had a 
positive but smaller effect on EU support.  A more recent analysis by Chalmers and Dellmuth (2015) 
using data on ERDF allocations for 2007-2010 found that the Cohesion Policy funding did not have a 
direct effect on public support for the EU, but rather a conditional effect mediated by the level of 
citizens’ European identity and education.  
Going beyond this literature, we develop hypotheses to examine the relationship between Cohesion 
Policy and European identity by drawing on the wider literature on the determinants of European 
identity.  
Cognitive	mobilisation	
The existing literature highlights ‘cognitive mobilisation’ (Inglehart 1970) as an important 
mechanism impacting on European identity. This is understood as the ability of citizens to relate to 
EU as a political regime as a result of having the cognitive skills (such as education and political 
interest or engagement) for understanding information about European integration. Some studies 
find strong support for the impact of cognitive mobilization on European identity (Bellucci et al. 
2012; Díez Medrano and Guittiérez 2001 in Spanish context). Others have found that knowledge 
about the EU has a significant but limited effect on European identity when compared to other 
factors (Verhaegen and Hooghe 2015) or is not significant in the case of Central and Eastern 
European Member States (Schilde 2013). Instead of proposing any general impact of knowledge 
about the EU on identity, we are suggesting that awareness of specific funding programmes under 
Cohesion Policy, i.e. knowledge about how the EU provides structural support to regions and 
individuals, will contribute to EU identity. In that sense, we are proposing that what matters is not 
so much knowing what the EU is but rather what the EU does. 
H1. AWARENESS. The higher the awareness of EU structural funds, the higher the probability 
of developing a strong EU identity. 
Instrumental rationality  
Another key factor driving European identity relates to material interests based on 
instrumental/functionalist calculations about the costs and benefits from European integration for a 
country and its citizens. This perspective echoes neofunctionalist theory (Haas 2004) expectations 
of economic cooperation and problem-solving by EU institutions leading to a transfer of loyalties to 
the EU. A number of studies have shown that the winners from European integration are more likely 
to identify positively with the EU than the losers (Laffan 2004; Fligstein 2009; Fligstein et al. 2012; 
Bellucci et al 2012). In addition, there is evidence that the perceived economic benefits are a more 
important determinant of European identity than the actual benefits to a country based on 
objective indicators (Verhaegen et al 2014). As noted, Verhaegen et al. (2014) did not find a 
significant relationship between EU Structural Fund allocations (or net payments from the EU 
budget) at the country level and the strength of citizens’ European identity. However, they did not 
estimate the impact of perceived benefits from EU Structural Funds at the individual level because 
the Eurobarometer data used does not include such questions. We are suggesting that perceived 
benefits, both for the individual and for their region’s development, contribute to EU identity. 
H2. BENEFITS. The higher the perceived benefits from the EU funds, the stronger the 
EU identity.  
An important qualification when it comes to instrumental rationality is of course that perceived 
benefits should in some way reflect real benefits. We can only measure perceptions at individual 
level, while real benefits remain constant within regions, so if we want to avoid falling into the trap 
of ecological fallacies we cannot specify a meaningful hypothesis about the direct impact of real 
benefits, i.e. funding allocations on European identity. In more substantive terms: real benefits need 
to be perceived by the individual in order to make an impact. What we are suggesting instead is an 
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interaction effect between perceived and real benefits, i.e. that perceptions should matter more 
where they are reflecting larger investments. 
H3. PERCEIVED AND REAL BENEFITS. Perceived benefits of EU funding have a 
stronger impact on EU identity in regions with a high allocation of EU funding per capita 
 
Psychological persuasion and symbolism 
EU exposure and persuasion are top-down drivers of European identity and refer to the actions of 
EU institutions to promote identity-building policies and political symbols e.g. the European flag, 
the Euro bank note and Europe Day (Bruter 2003, 2005; Cram 2012; Cram and Patriokis 2014; Risse 
2003; Laffan 2004). Various studies conclude that the EU has contributed to European identity 
through European symbols and the Euro (Bruter 2005; 2009; Risse 2003; 2014), media campaigns 
(Bruter 2005; Stoeckel 2011; Harrison and Bruter 2014) and elite discourses and narratives (Risse 
2010). A methodologically sophisticated example is the Harrison and Bruter (2014) panel-study 
experiment.  The study exposed participants across six European countries to EU symbols and news 
stories – which were either positive or negative depending on the group – through weekly 
newsletters over a two-year period to study short-term priming effects and so-called sleeper effects 
that accelerate over the longer-term on citizens’ European identity. The study confirmed that news 
and symbols did impact on citizens’ European identity and that this effect increased over time. 
We are proposing both direct and indirect effects of EU communication on European identity. On 
the one hand, the EU advertises its funded projects, either directly on the ground through project 
publicity (plaques, banners and posters with the EU emblem and acknowledgment of EU co-
funding), or via online and social media channels. On the other hand, respondents are exposed to 
different types of media and varying content in media coverage of EU politics in general and EU-
funded projects in particular. We assume that media exposure, EU media coverage and EU 
communications can all contribute to the strengthening of European identity. 
These considerations lead us to our final hypothesis 
H4. COMMUNICATION. Effective advertising of projects funded under Cohesion Policy and 
exposure to European framing of media coverage of such projects strengthen European identity. 
As a logical additional step, we also consider that communication relates strongly to cognitive 
mobilization and may reasonably be regarded as one of its key drivers. While we propose direct 
communication effects on European identity in H4, we also test afterwards for a more indirect path 
from communication to identity. We do this by estimating the impact of communication, media 
exposure and media coverage on awareness of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
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3.! Data and empirical strategy 
 
In order to gain new insights into the impact of Cohesion Policy on citizens’ perceptions of the 
policy and identification with the EU, we commissioned a telephone survey (carried out by GfK) of 
representative samples of adults in seventeen regions across twelve EU member states1 (Borz, 
Brandenburg and Mendez 2018). Sample size per region was 500.2 It is important to note that 
samples are representative for the regional populations, not for national populations. Apart from 
Cyprus, which constitutes a single NUTS2 region, we selected one or two regions per country, but 
since we were interested in controlling for regional variation in EU funding and absorption when 
estimating the impact of perceptions on identity, we opted for representative regional samples 
which do not sum up to representative national samples for any included country. 
GfK adopted random digit dialling (RDD) to generate random phone numbers, for both a landline 
and mobile sample. Achieving a response rate of 11%, the data were then weighted by gender, age 
and education against existing NUTS2 regional population data. All subsequent analysis are based 
on weighted data from all regions. 
This was a relatively short survey, consisting of forty questions, and interviews took no longer than 
fifteen minutes. We asked respondents about their awareness of Cohesion Policy funds as well as 
awareness of communication efforts to publicise these funds, their perceptions of benefits for their 
region and themselves, their attachment to the EU, as well as more general questions about 
ideology, party choice and a small range of socio-demographic questions. Throughout, we aimed to 
replicate questions that have been asked previously on these issues, either in Eurobarometer 
surveys, the European Election Study or the European Social Survey, to ensure comparability 
between our regional findings and previous surveys based on national samples (see the appendix for 
the full list and detailed description of all variables subsequently included in our analyses). 
In terms of empirical strategy, in order to answer what drives individuals’ identity across Europe we 
use a multilevel multinomial logistic model which can accommodate either nominal or ordinal 
dependent variables. Our assumption is for a gradual progression of identity, from country only, 
country and European, European and Country and European. We however also acknowledge that it 
is possible for citizens to shift from a country only identity to a European and country citizen 
identity. For this reason, a multilevel multinomial model is appropriate as it will calculate the odds 
of choosing a mixed or European identity in comparison to the country only identity which we 
consider the base category in our model. A multilevel model is also appropriate in this case because 
it allows us to control for actual Cohesion Policy allocations as well as frequency, saliency and tone 
of national and regional media coverage of Cohesion Policy among other regional-level variables.  
 
Dependent	variable		
Our dependent variable is the level of European identity. We adopt a novel and gradual approach to 
the concept of identity to include various stages from a sole country identity to a sole European 
Identity. Our survey asks the following question: Q13 [S] Please listen to the following options and 
                                                                    
1
 Cyprus, Kentriki-Makedonia (Greece) Cyprus, Baden-Württemberg, Thüringen (Germany), Nyugat-Dunántúl 
(Hungary), Southern and Eastern (Republic of Ireland), Lombardia (Italy), Podkarpackie, Pomorskie (Poland), 
Vest (Romania), Zahodna Slovenija (Slovenia), Castilla y León, Andalucía (Spain), Flevoland, Limburg 
(Netherlands), Scotland, North East England (United Kingdom) 
2
 Exceptions are South-East Ireland with 501 and Limburg with 558 completed interviews, respectively. 
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pick one that describes best how you see yourself. Do you see yourself as: country, country and 
European, European and Country and European.  Our data  shows that across our regions a 
confortable majority of citizens have some form of European identity (Figure X below). Almost half 
of our respondents (49 percent) think of themselves as having a mixed identity (citizens of their 
country and citizens of Europe), 9 percent also have a mixed identity which puts Europe before their 
country and 9 percent of respondents think of themselves as Europeans. Only 32 percent of 
respondents have a sole country identity, which suggests that after we exclude those who refused 
to answer (1%) and thse who do not know (1%), a strong majority of Europeans (67%) have some 
form of European identity.  
Figure 1: Predominant Identity across regions 
 
 
This operationalization of European identity has often been employed by other scholars (Citrin and 
Sides 2004; Fligstein, 2009; Kuhn, 2012; Ceka and Sojka 2016). While previous studies have recoded 
this question into a dichotomous variable distinguishing between exclusive national identification 
(‘nationality only’) and those who reported some sort of European identification, we adopt a 
gradual approach, since we are assuming that the final three categories of the variable capture a 
graduate variation in intensity of European identity. Thus, we can capture not just what explains the 
core difference between purely national and some identification with Europe, but also what are the 
drivers of a deeper sense of belonging to Europe. Since our sample size is large enough for our 
models to cope with a four-category dependent variable, there is no good reason to artificially 
reduce variation by collapsing categories. But we did run robustness checks with a dichotomized 
dependent variable, which confirm the overall findings and are available upon request. 
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Independent	variables	
Our core independent variables of theoretical interest are Cohesion Policy awareness, perception of 
benefits, and exposure to communication and media consumption. 
To measure awareness, we asked respondents a separate question [Have you heard about the 
following funds? … Yes; No; DK] about each of the three funds associated with Cohesion Policy – the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF) and the European Social 
Fund (ESF).  
We are using two separate questions to measure perception of benefits from a personal as well as 
more general perspective, quite similar to the distinction between pocketbook and socio-tropic 
economic voting. The personal question reads: [Have you benefited in your daily life from a project 
funded by any of these three funds? Yes; No, DK] while the more general measure of perceived 
benefits is covered by this question: [How do you think your region or city would have developed 
without EU funding? Much better; somewhat better; same; somewhat worse; a lot worse; DK]. 
Finally, we included three types of communication variables: 
¥ a battery of questions about media use, asking how many days a week a respondent uses 
national TV, national newspapers, regional or local newspapers, radio, social media or 
European media to inform themselves about current affairs.  
¥ In order to capture not just which media a respondent is consuming but also variation in the 
content they are exposed to, we merged in data from a media study that was part of the 
same project. In particular, we added a regional-level variable which measures the 
percentage of stories about Cohesion Policy in national and regional newspapers that use a 
European frame rather than a national frame in their coverage (Triga and Vadratsikas 2018).  
¥ We also asked about whether a respondent has noticed any public acknowledgement of EU 
funding in their region/town in the form of banners, placards etc., or whether they have ever 
visited EU websites.  
Control	variables	
In order to estimate the effective impact of our independent variables of interest, we of course need 
to control for factors that have previously been shown to drive identity, European or otherwise. We 
use standard measures as previously employed in Eurobarometer studies, the European Social 
Survey and European Election Studies. Firstly, we control for cognitive mobilisation beyond 
awareness of Cohesion Policy – that includes measures of education, standard of living, interest in 
and knowledge about EU politics. Also, we consider that, in line with socialisation theories, 
European identity can be shaped by transnational interactions among citizens and university 
students (Mitchell 2014; Stoeckel 2016; Fligstein 2009; Kuhn 2012; Bellucci et al 2012). We measure 
this through two variables, first a question that asks whether a respondent has lived in another EU 
country for more than three months, and secondly through a variable we call “EU socialisation” – 
this is a scale that combines respondents answers to a battery of questions about whether during 
the last twelve months they have visited another EU country, read a book or watched a TV 
programme in a different language than their own, socialised with citizens from other EU countries, 
or ordered or purchased any goods or services online from another country.  
We are also controlling for obvious strong drivers of European identity (actually factors that may be 
considered endogenous to European identity), like trusting the EU to work in one’s interest, 
attachment to Europe, expressing feelings of EU citizenship or considering Europeans to share a 
common heritage. Furthermore, we include attitudes towards immigration, general left-right 
ideology, working in the agricultural sector, and basic socio-demographics like age. We also control 
for a number of regional-level variables, including the quality of regional government, regional 
autonomy using the EQI and RAI self-rule indices respectively (European Commission 2017a; 
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Hooghe et al. 2016), past funding absorption performance (European Commission 2017b) and 
unemployment rates (Eurostat). 
A	brief	note	about	independence	of	our	independent	variables	
Before getting into the full analysis to test our hypotheses from the previous section, we need to 
address possible queries about the independent nature of our main explanatory variables. Quite 
reasonably, commentators might question whether causality might not actually be reversed, 
namely with European identity driving awareness and perceptions, i.e. the more European you feel 
the more likely you are (or claim to be) aware of what the EU does and be satisfied that this has 
helped you or your region. And surely, all across European regions there will be prior levels of EU 
identity that have nothing to do with awareness of funding or perception of benefits. But if our 
independent variables were mere proxies for such prior identification, we should expect that 
variation in awareness levels and perception of benefits across European regions remain largely 
unrelated to actual funding allocations since funding is not concentrated in areas where prior levels 
of European identity peak. Of course, to use any aggregate-level evidence in order to say something 
about an individual-level relationship always carries with it the danger of ecological fallacies, but in 
this case, some simple correlations and figures that illustrate the relationship between funding 
allocations and awareness/benefits provide very neat illustrations of just how unlikely it is that prior 
identification is what drives our explanatory variables.  
When comparing the proportions of each regional sample who are aware of either of the three 
funds we asked about with the actual allocation of structural funding to each region in the period 
2007-13, we find substantive correlations, ranging from .57 (ESF) to .69 (Cohesion Fund). That 
means that the more money allocated to a region the higher the awareness in the population of 
these funding mechanisms. In Figure 1, we plot funding allocations (x-axis) against the per cent of 
the regional population that has heard of the Cohesion Fund (y-axis), which is the least well known 
fund and around which levels of awareness vary most across regions. Each dot represents one of the 
seventeen regions in our sample. We further divided those regions that received Cohesion Funds 
(blue dots) from those that did not (orange dots). Apart from the strong overall correlation, we do 
also find that coming from a region that did receive Cohesion Fund allocations makes respondents 
on average about three times as likely to have heard of it. The only non-receiving region with a 
considerable proportion aware of the Cohesion Fund is the Irish region (a major beneficiary in earlier 
decades) – 36% and thus more than in Cyprus which did receive allocations. Other than that, 
typically only a small minority of ten per cent or so has heard of it where no allocations have been 
received.  
If prior identity were a core driver of awareness, how could it be that in countries that have 
traditionally high levels of EU-attachment and identity, like Germany, only a tiny minority of 10% or 
so has ever heard of the Cohesion Fund? The fact that there is such an aware minority in Germany, 
or the Netherlands, and also that there are large groups who remain unaware in regions that have 
received much Cohesion Fund transfers, does suggest that much individual-level variation is not 
explained by simple funding allocations. But the overall distributions across regions rule out prior 
European identification as the key driver of such individual-level variation. 
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Figure 2: Regional EU funding and awareness of Cohesion Fund 
 
Similarly, we find perceived benefits to relate even more strongly to allocations. In Figure 2, funding 
allocations per region are plotted against the proportion that said their region would have 
developed worse without EU funding. The correlation here is much higher at .81, and we can see 
quite clearly that almost all of that positive correlation is produced by regions that are in receipt of 
Cohesion Fund allocations. All of those cases are very close to the regression line, while there is 
considerable variation across non-recipients of Cohesion Policy funds. Again, the Irish (Sothern and 
Eastern) region tops that group of regions, with a clear majority of 59% stating that their region 
would have developed worse without EU funding, while the two Dutch regions (Limburg and 
Flevoland) produce the lowest percentages. 
Figure 3: Regional EU funding and perceived regional benefits 
 
Again, the more a region received, the higher the percentage of respondents perceiving benefits 
from such funding, which may sound overly obvious, but it crucially implies that where funding 
matters to such an extent, prior identification can at best be a secondary (if at all) driver of 
perceptions. 
Neither awareness nor perceived benefits are concentrated in regions with high levels of prior 
European identification. Treating awareness and benefits as independent variables provides an 
empirical test of whether such funding and becoming aware and appreciative of it can actually help 
generate new or additional levels of European identity - which in the absence of such funding would 
be lacking. That is what we are aiming for in the following analysis. The brief discussion here and 
the evidence from Figures 1 and 2 are not meant to prove that there can only be one direction of 
causality; they are only intended to help make our case for a research design that aims to estimate 
the marginal effect of awareness and perceived benefits of EU Cohesion Policy funds on relative 
levels of identification with Europe. 
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4.! Does EU Cohesion Policy impact on European identity? 
 
AWARENESS	(H1)	
Our first hypothesis was that awareness of Cohesion Policy funds increases citizen’s European 
identity. We find that H1 is supported by our multilevel analysis. The higher the level of awareness 
of EU funding, the stronger the European component of individual’s identity. Distinguishing 
between Funds, awareness of the ERDF contributes to the development of a mixed identity: 
country and EU, while those who heard of the EU Cohesion Fund are more likely to develop a mixed 
identity: country and EU or, even more so, an identity which puts EU before their country. By 
contrast, awareness of the ESF is not a significant predictor of identity and does not contribute to 
the development of an EU identity.  
Cohesion Fund awareness has the biggest impact on European identity. The stronger cognitive 
mobilisation effect of this fund is most likely due to the greater visibility of the Cohesion Fund than 
the ERDF/ESF given its focus on large-scale transport and environmental infrastructure projects 
often carrying large publicity banners and placards. Indeed, our analysis show that seeing EU 
project banners/placards has a stronger impact on awareness of the Cohesion Fund than on the 
other two funds. 
 
BENEFITS	(H2)	
Turning to the instrumental rationality hypothesis, we argued that the higher the perceived benefits 
from the EU funds, the stronger the EU identity (H2). Our results differentiate between country, 
regional and individual benefits. In line with our argument, perceived regional benefits influence the 
development of a mixed country and EU identity. Those who believe that their region would have 
developed worse without EU funds tend to choose a mixed Country and EU or EU and country or 
even an EU identity over a sole country identity. The type of predominant identity changes when we 
move to the individual level benefits. Perceived individual benefits foster all mixed identities, and 
especially a sole identification with Europe. The more individuals think they benefitted in their daily 
life from the EU, the more attached to Europe they become.  
Somewhat surprisingly, those who think that their country benefitted from the EU funds still have a 
predominant country identity. One explanation for this result might be that citizens want to take 
advantage of the benefits of membership but are not willing to change their identity and are not 
welcoming the development of the EU project. This is also in line with previous research which 
shows that individuals who think that their country benefitted from EU membership do not 
necessarily want further integration (Rose and Borz 2016). In other words, the country benefits may 
work as an instrumental rationality for endorsing membership but not for developing an EU identity.  
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Table 1: Explaining European identity (multinomial logit MLM, ordinal dep. variable, base 
category=country) 
 Country & European European & country European 
Awareness       
heard of ERDF 1.309** (0.111) 1.040 (0.125) 0.887    (0.113)    
heard of Cohesion Fund 1.364*** (0.112) 1.428** (0.167) 1.164    (0.155)    
heard of ESF 0.930 (0.068) 0.833 (0.088) 0.965    (0.113)    
Benefits       
country benefited from EU membership 0.746*** (0.027) 0.808*** (0.045) 0.902    (0.052)    
region worse without EU funds 1.112** (0.037) 1.097 (0.052) 1.029    (0.052)    
region benefits more than the rest of 
country 
1.015 (0.054) 1.022 (0.074) 1.037    (0.080)    
benefitted in daily life from EU 1.360** (0.134) 1.315* (0.175) 1.450*   (0.217)    
Communication       
publicity of funding via banners/placards 1.168* (0.090) 0.897 (0.098) 0.799    (0.094)    
EU media exposure 1.023 (0.020) 1.064* (0.026) 1.158*** (0.028)    
Cognitive mobilization        
education 1.212*** (0.031) 1.181*** (0.044) 1.153*** (0.047)    
standard of living 1.056 (0.032) 0.993 (0.043) 1.025    (0.048)    
interest in EU politics 1.111** (0.040) 1.105 (0.058) 1.121*   (0.063)    
knowledge about EU 1.224** (0.091) 1.176 (0.122) 0.971    (0.109)    
lived in another EU country 1.147 (0.099) 1.687*** (0.191) 2.309*** (0.278)    
EU socialization 1.052*** (0.015) 1.066** (0.022) 1.062**  (0.024)    
trusts EU works in one's interest 1.092* (0.047) 1.286*** (0.081) 1.157*   (0.077)    
L-R ideology 0.961** (0.013) 0.939** (0.018) 0.901*** (0.019)    
Attachment       
attachment to Europe 1.415*** (0.054) 1.500*** (0.088) 1.635*** (0.101)    
attributes meaning to EU citizenship 1.927*** (0.113) 2.177*** (0.184) 2.136*** (0.195)    
Europeans share common heritage 1.116*** (0.037) 1.049 (0.049) 1.100    (0.056)    
Immigration        
immigration changed country (+) 1.062*** (0.015) 1.127*** (0.023) 1.125*** (0.025)    
age 0.998 (0.002) 0.989*** (0.003) 0.998    (0.003)    
agricultural sector 0.765 (0.111) 0.674 (0.159) 1.067    (0.254)    
Regional level        
unemployment 0.946*** (0.008) 0.974* (0.010) 1.060*** (0.014)    
decentralization 1.008 (0.010) 1.053*** (0.014) 1.120*** (0.017)    
EU funds absorption rate 2007-13 0.975*** (0.005) 0.944*** (0.007) 0.930*** (0.009)    
alloc0713pc 1.001*** (0.000) 1.001*** (0.000) 1.002*** (0.000)    
quality of government 2017 1.307* (0.162) 2.990*** (0.515) 14.43*** (3.553)    
Media EU valence (log) 1.045 (0.127) 2.318*** (0.387) 3.970*** (0.718)    
Media EU civic (log) 1.313*** (0.067) 1.210** (0.087) 0.748*** (0.057)    
       
Allocation/cap X benefits in daily life  1.000* 0.000 1.000* (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
Allocation/cap X country benefited from 
membership 
1.000* 0.000 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
Pseudo R-Square 17.2                   
chi2 2979                   
p .000                   
Significance codes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
	
PERCEIVED	VERSUS	REAL	BENEFITS	(H3)	
Of particular interest is the link between perceived and real individual benefits from integration as 
not all individuals may be aware of them, and how this is related to the development of a European 
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identity. The expectation was that perceived benefits of EU funding are likely to have a stronger 
impact on EU identity in regions with a high allocation of EU funding per capita (H3). 
We test the interaction between allocations of EU funding per capita and perceived individual 
benefits from EU funding in our model (see table 1). In order to visualize the impact on identity, 
figure 4 below shows the marginal effects of perceived benefits on identity when taking into 
account the real benefits of individuals in their region. What the graph shows is that perceived 
benefits in daily life (red line) are conducive to a mixed and also European only identity, especially 
when the allocation of EU funding is over 1000 EUR/capita in the region of residence.   
We show firstly that there is an association between real regional benefits and perceived individual 
benefits. Secondly, the amount of funding matters for individuals’ perceptions and also for the 
development of their EU identity. Those who think EU had a positive effect in their daily life and live 
in a region where the allocation of EU funds is over 1000 EUR per capita are more likely to develop 
an EU identity than those who do not see any individual benefits from EU funds but still live in the 
same region.  
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Interaction of Perceived and Real benefits on identity development  
 
COMMUNICATION	(H4)	
As expected, the way EU’s contribution or activity is reported matters for people’s identity 
development (H4). The use of EU funds has to be acknowledged at the regional level. EU publicity 
and information rules oblige projects to acknowledge EU co-funding including requirements for 
billboards and plaques (in large projects) and guidance on how to exhibit the EU emblem to 
publicise the EU contribution to regional development and increase citizens appreciation. Our 
survey results show that the communication EU projects via banners or placards contributes to the 
the development of a mixed identity country and EU identity.  
Additionally, the more individuals are exposed to any sort of EU media, such as Euronews which 
cover extensively developments in EU politics and member states politics, the more they are likely 
to put EU first in terms of identity.  
Finally, we also find that the more a respondent is exposed to European and civic framing of 
Cohesion Policy stories in their national and regional media, the more likely they are to develop a 
mixed national and European identity. 
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5.! What explains Cohesion Policy awareness? 
 
As mentioned in our theory section, while hypothesising separately direct effects of both awareness 
and communication on European identity, we are aware of the obvious inter-relationship between 
these two variables. Hence, while communication and media coverage emerge as significant factors 
in the preceding analysis, we may be under-estimating the true scale of the impact of 
communication since we are treating cognitive mobilisation (i.e. awareness of EU structural and 
cohesion funds) as an individual-level characteristic without considering the sources of such 
cognitive mobilisation. To this we turn now. We ran similar models to the ones presented in Table 1, 
only now we replaced our previous dependent variable on European identity with awareness of each 
of the three structural and cohesion funds. The model specifications change accordingly; the 
following are logistic MLM regressions; three separate regressions, presented in tables 2 a-c, with a 
dichotomous dependent variable, trying to explain whether or not a respondent is aware of the 
ERDF, Cohesion Fund or the ESF. 
 
Explaining	Cohesion	Fund	awareness	
Controlling for a range of expected drivers of cognitive mobilization (education, ideology, general 
political knowledge and interest), it emerges that one of the strongest predictors of CF awareness 
are indeed media exposure and communication of EU funding (see table 2). The awareness 
increases when the national media stories on Cohesion Policy emphasise issues such as common 
cultural heritage or civic belonging to the EU (Triga and Vadratsikas 2018). The same is valid when 
national media links elements of Cohesion Policy with the idea of the EU as a common project 
(Triga and Vadratsikas 2018).   
While the model reported in Table2 just shows a general positive impact of media exposure on 
awareness, we also ran additional models (available from the authors on request) where we 
introduced each media outlet in the analysis separately; then we found that national newspapers 
and radio are the most effective and significant at raising awareness of the Cohesion Fund. 
European media and social media do not seem to play an important role in raising awareness in this 
case. The explanation for this result could be related to the type of projects funded by the CF and 
the way information is disseminated about them. It may also reflect the lack of interest by citizens 
in using social media to inform themselves or engage in discussion about Cohesion Fund projects.  
The strongest driver of awareness (considerably stronger than media exposure, media coverage or 
any of the other drivers of cognitive mobilization) is direct EU communication of Cohesion Fund 
projects. It is the communication on the ground, billboards at construction sites etc. which 
generates awareness. Those who recall having seen such billboard or placards are more than twice 
as likely to have heard of the Cohesion Fund than those who do not. 
 
 
Table 2: Explaining CF awareness (Dependent variable: heard of Cohesion Fund Q9_2)  
 OR SE 
media exposure: TV, newspapers, social media, EU media 1.141*** (0.024)    
publicity of funding via banners/placards 2.133*** (0.138)    
visited EU official websites  1.003 (0.007) 
   
Education 1.254*** (0.028)    
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standard of living 1.043    (0.028)    
interest in EU politics 1.364*** (0.044)    
knowledge about the EU 1.459*** (0.091)    
lived in another EU c'try 0.949    (0.065)    
EU socialization 1.040**  (0.013)    
   
L-R ideology 0.975*   (0.011)    
c'try changed positively because of immigration 1.016    (0.012)    
   
Age 1.019*** (0.002)    
agricultural sector 1.372*   (0.174)    
   
Unemployment 0.978    (0.041)    
decentralization 0.859**  (0.047)    
EU funds absorption rate 2007-13 1.090**  (0.031)    
Allocation of EU funds 07-13/pc 0.999    (0.001)    
quality of government 2017 0.270*   (0.172)    
National media: EU valence + (log) 0.351    (0.234)    
National media: EU civic attitudes (log) 1.800*   (0.457)    
   
N 7354  
McKelvey & Zavoina's R-Square  0.29                
chi2 751.873     
p 0.000     
Significance codes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
In stark contrast, and against our expectationswe find that visiting EU official websites (of the 
European Commission or the European Parliament) does not increase citizens’ awareness about the 
CF. This could either be related to the content of those websites or to the very low usage of those 
websites by the average European citizen.  
Our results also show that EU funds absorption rates increases awareness of CF. Logically, citizens 
can only be aware of projects if they are delivered on the ground and are visible, but this also implies 
that effective management and delivery matters for increasing citizen awareness.  
When in the same model from Table2, allocation of EU funds per capita is replaced by the attribute 
of being eligible for the Cohesion Fund, we find an extremely strong link between beneficiaries and 
awareness. Individuals from CF eligible countries3 have heard much more about the CF than 
individuals from ineligible countries. The strength of the effect is also visible in Figure 5. 
Unsurprisingly, the level of awareness is three times higher in eligible than in ineligible countries.  
Figure 5 below shows the strength of influence derived from each determinant of CF awareness. 
Education, interest in politics and knowledge about the EU are the control variables already 
expected to be significant. The more educated and more interested in the EU politics or 
knowledgeable about the EU individuals are, the higher their level of awareness about CF becomes. 
However, even when controlling for these cognitive traits and significant regional characteristics, 
the mobilization through media and the publicity of projects via billboards matters significantly.  
EU socialization is also important for raising awareness, however the effect is not very strong. This 
may be partly due to the fact that socialization activities included in our analysis (visited another 
                                                                    
3
 As of 2013, we consider as CF beneficiary countries: Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Spain, 
Slovenia.  
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European country, read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than your mother 
tongue, socialised with people from another EU country, watched TV programs in a language other 
than your mother tongue, Ordered or purchased a good or service online from another country 
within the EU) are not conducive to finding or being exposed to more information about the 
Cohesion Fund.   
 
Figure 5: Explaining Cohesion Fund Awareness 
 
	
 
 
 
	
Comparing	Cohesion	Fund	awareness	with	ERDF	and	ESF	awareness	
In comparing Cohesion Fund awareness with ERDF and ESF awareness, the difference we observe is 
in the impact of publicity via billboards. This is by far the largest predictor of ERDF awareness (See 
table 3). Those who have heard about the ERDF fund are also the largest category in our sample to 
have noticed the public acknowledgement of EU funding via billboards (figure 6 below).  
Again, while media exposure as such has a general positive effect, as can be seen from Table 3, 
there is variation across different media types. In additional analyses (available upon request from 
the authors), we re-ran the model but introducing types of media as separate variables. The findings 
are similar to what we found about the impact of media use on CF awareness: national newspapers 
media exposure
publicity of funding via banners/placards
visited EU official websites 
education
standard of living 
interest in EU politics
knowledge about the EU
lived in another EU c'try
EU socialization
L-R ideology
c'try changed positively because of immigration
age
manual worker
unemployment 2016
decentralization
EU funds absorption rate 2007-13
CF beneficiaries
quality of government 2017
National media: EU valence + (log)
National media: EU civic attitudes (log)
-1 0 1 2
Effects on Linear Prediction
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs
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and radio matter the most at raising awareness about ERDF. The tone or the civic elements in the 
media content are not significant in the case of ERDF awareness. This could be because of the 
different nature of ERDF goals and projects relative to the CF and ESF as discussed further below.  
 
Table 3: Explaining ERDF awareness (Dependent variable: heard of ERDF Q9_1)  
 OR SE 
media exposure: TV, newspapers, social media, EU media 1.130*** (0.024)    
publicity of funding via banners/placards 2.981*** (0.187)    
   
education 1.196*** (0.027)    
standard of living 1.070**  (0.028)    
interest in EU politics 1.312*** (0.041)    
knowledge about EU 1.325*** (0.085)    
lived in another EU country 0.979    (0.070)    
EU socialization 1.052*** (0.014)    
   
L-R ideology 0.984    (0.012)    
country changed because of immigration 1.007    (0.012)    
age 1.026*** (0.002)    
agricultural sector 0.957    (0.127)    
   
unemployment 0.935    (0.033)    
Decentralization  0.931    (0.042)    
EU funds absorption rate 2007-13 1.028    (0.024)    
alloc0713pc 0.999*** (0.000)    
quality of government 2017 0.259*   (0.138)    
EU valence log 0.292*   (0.161)    
EU civic log 1.070    (0.224)    
   
Pseudo R-Square 0.30  
chi2 893.024     
p 0.000     
Significance codes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 6: Publicity via banners and awareness of funds  
 
 
As in the case of Cohesion Fund, the awareness of ERDF is directly influenced by education, interest 
and knowledge of EU politics and also slightly by the level of EU socialization.  
Figure 7: Explaining ERDF awareness 
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As far as ESF awareness is concerned, the picture is slightly different. Media exposure has a slightly 
stronger impact on awareness in the case of ESF. TV, radio, national, regional, local newspapers 
readership and also exposure to European media matter for raising ESF awareness.  The media 
content has to emphasize civic attitudes towards Europe in connection to these projects in order to 
raise awareness. This may be related to fact that the ESF has a people-based focus aiming to 
reducing social inequalities between citizens across Europe and even facilitating mobility to work 
abroad. This closer relationship with people and a ‘we feeling’ may explain why the civic content of 
national media and the emphasis on Europe as a common project emerge as strong predictors of 
awareness for these funds, while less so in the case of the ERDF which has a strong economic 
development rationale and aims at reducing disparities across places rather than people.   
Table 4: Explaining ESF awareness (Dependent variable: heard of ERDF Q9_3)  
 OR SE 
media exposure: TV, newspapers, social media, EU media 1.180*** (0.022)    
publicity of funding via banners/ 1.917*** (0.107)    
visited official EU websites   
   
education 1.060**  (0.020)    
standard of living 1.027    (0.023)    
interest in EU politics 1.262*** (0.035)    
knowledge about EU 1.041    (0.057)    
lived in another EU c'try 1.073    (0.065)    
EU socialization 1.014    (0.011)    
   
L-R ideology 0.958*** (0.010)    
c'try changed positively because of immigration 1.021*   (0.010)    
   
age 1.005*** (0.002)    
agricultural sector 0.942    (0.108)    
Regional level    
unemployment 0.981    (0.015)    
decentralization 0.984    (0.020)    
EU funds absorption rate 2007-13 1.000    (0.011)    
Allocation of EU funding 200-13/pc 1.000    (0.000)    
quality of government 2017 0.948    (0.226)    
EU valence log 1.001    (0.248)    
EU civic log 1.405*** (0.133)    
   
Pseudo R-Square 0.12           
chi2 547.401     
p 0.000     
Significance codes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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6.! Conclusion 
This research paper investigated the impact of EU Cohesion Policy on citizens’ identification with 
Europe at the regional level. To do so, an original and representative survey was commission of 
more than 8,500 citizens in 17 regions across 12 EU member states, which vary considerably in 
terms of Cohesion Policy allocations, attitudes to the EU, political-institutional conditions and 
economic development. Multilevel regression analysis was employed to estimate the impact of 
awareness of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds, perceived benefits for individuals and their 
region’s development, and the communication of EU funding on the likelihood that a respondent 
develops a European identity. A novel gradual approach to measuring EU identity was adopted by 
considering various stages in the shift from a sole identification with one’s home country to a mixed 
national and European identity, to sole identification with Europe.  
Overall, the findings provide clear evidence of the positive impact of Cohesion Policy on European 
identity. Awareness of the ERDF and CF in particular, but not the ESF, make a real difference to 
citizens’ identification with Europe. The perceived economic benefits of Cohesion Policy for 
individual’s daily lives and for their region's development also contribute to European identity. 
Finally, we confirm the importance of communication efforts for European identity. Having seen EU 
banners and placards on EU projects increases citizens’ identification with the EU. Additionally, the 
more individuals are exposed to EU media, such as Euronews which cover extensively developments 
in EU politics and member states politics, the more they are likely to put EU first in terms of their 
identity.  We also find that the more a respondent is exposed to European and civic framing of 
Cohesion Policy news stories in their national and regional media, the more likely they are to 
develop a Europeanised identity. 
These finding contribute to the European identity literature by demonstrating, for the first time, 
how a crucial EU policy that accounts for a third of the EU’s budget impacts positively on citizens’ 
European identity. This contrasts with the findings of the only previous study to investigate this 
relationship, which concluded that EU Structural Fund allocations did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the strength of citizens’ European identity (Verhaegen and Hooghe 2015). 
Importantly, that study was unable to incorporate other non-financial variables about Cohesion 
policy attitudes into the analysis due to a lack of data in the Eurobarometer survey used. In 
commissioning a new survey, we were able to provide a more comprehensive test to incorporate 
subjective mechanisms at the individual level. These subjective factors are recognised to be 
important drivers of identity but have yet to be investigated in relation to EU Cohesion Policy, 
namely: cognitive mobilisation (awareness of Cohesion funding), instrumental calculations 
(perceived benefits to individuals and regional development) and communication (exposure to EU-
funded project publicity and the media).  We found that real and perceived benefits both impact on 
identity individually and through an interaction effect. Citizens who say they have benefitted in 
their daily life from EU-funded projects are more likely to develop an EU identity than those who 
have not, but this is only the case in regions where the allocation of EU funds is over 1000 EUR per 
capita.  
These findings have important policy implications in the context of the post-2020 EU budget and 
Cohesion policy negotiations currently underway and against a backcloth of rising populism and 
mistrust in parts of the EU. Most importantly, it demonstrates that if EU policymakers want to 
promote regional and local identification with the EU, Cohesion Policy is clearly an effective 
instrument. The second key finding is that communication is an effective tool for increasing citizens’ 
identification with the EU. In particular, banners, billboards etc. at EU funded project sites are 
effective means to make citizens aware of EU investments, and actually have both direct and 
indirect effects on identity. By implication, efforts to improve the quality of publicity, symbols and 
messaging around EU funding, such as reducing the technical jargon in EU banners, plaques and 
posters and making them more visually appealing, could potentially improve public awareness and 
perceptions of the EU.  
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More generally, these findings substantiate the emphasis placed by the Council, Parliament, 
Commission and Committee of the Regions on communication and the need to raise the visibility of 
EU funding in order to connect with citizens. The fact that perceived benefits contributes to 
European identity implies that EU policymakers needs to be mindful of the potentially damaging 
consequences of negative publicity for public opinion. For instance, the Commission’s proposals for 
the 2021-2027 EU budget include conditionality provisions to make EU funding disbursements 
conditional on Member States compliance with the rule of law. The risk here is that Cohesion Policy 
could become politicised, leading to populist-driven resentment against the policy and the EU in 
countries where citizens perceive the EU to be punishing or treating them unfairly through 
Cohesion funding sanctions. 
Finally, this study demonstrates the benefits of survey research for conducting impact evaluation of 
EU Cohesion Policy communication strategies. Unlike existing Flash Eurobarometer surveys of 
Cohesion Policy awareness (European Commission 2017c), this should involve the use of 
representative citizen surveys at the regional level (rather than national level) given the policy’s 
subnational focus. Moreover, questions should not only ask about citizens’ awareness and 
perceptions of Cohesion policy but also about their attitudes to the EU, such as identity or the 
‘positive image of the EU’, not least because the latter is an official outcome target for Cohesion 
Policy at the Commission. This would allow causal relationships to be investigated between 
Cohesion policy attitudes and general EU attitudes. Similarly, experimental designs could be 
employed to investigate the impact of EU Cohesion Policy communication and to cross-validate our 
findings. Following Bruter and Harrison (2014), this could involve exposing groups of study 
participants to different Cohesion publicity messages and branding under treatment and control 
conditions. Both approaches allow cause-effect relationships to be studied more robustly than is 
currently done in existing EU and national evaluation studies on Cohesion Policy communication, 
and would lead to more reliable conclusions and policy recommendations about how to increase 
citizen appreciation of EU Cohesion Policy and the EU more generally.  
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Appendix 1: Operationalisation   
Variable name Level of 
measurement 
Question wording/measurement 
European	identity	 Individual	 “Please	 listen	 to	 the	 following	 options	 and	 pick	 one	 that	 describes	 best	 how	 you	 see	
yourself.	 Do	 you	 see	 yourself	 as	…”	Country	 only/Country	 and	 European/European	 and	
Country/European	
Heard	of	ERDF	 Individual		 “Have	you	heard	about	the	following	funds?	The	European	Regional	Development	Fund	
(ERDF)	…”	Yes/No	
Heard	of	CF	 Individual		 “Have	you	heard	about	the	following	funds?	The	Cohesion	Fund	…”	Yes/No	
Heard	of	ESF	 Individual		 “Have	you	heard	about	the	following	funds?	European	Social	Fund	(ESF)	…”	Yes/No	
country	benefited	from	EU	membership	 Individual		 “To	what	extent	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statement:	"My	country	has	benefited	
from	being	a	member	of	the	European	Union”?”	Strongly	agree/Agree/Neither	agree	nor	
disagree/Disagree/Strongly	disagree	
region	worse	without	EU	funds	 Individual		 “How	 do	 you	 think	 your	 region	 or	 city	 would	 have	 developed	 without	 EU	 funding?”		
Much	better/Somewhat	better/Same/Somewhat	worse/A	lot	worse	
region	benefits	more	than	the	rest	of	country	 Individual		 “Do	you	think	your	region	benefits	more,	less	or	the	same	from	EU	funding	than	the	rest	
of	your	country?”	More/Less/The	same	
benefitted	in	daily	life	from	EU	 Individual		 “Have	 you	 benefited	 in	 your	 daily	 life	 from	 a	 project	 funded	 by	 any	 of	 these	 three	
funds?”	Yes/No	
publicity	of	funding	via	banners/placards	 Individual		 “Have	you	noticed	any	public	acknowledgement	of	EU	funding	in	your	region/town	in	the	
form	of	banners,	placards	etc.?”	Yes/No	
EU	media	exposure	 Individual		 “How	many	days	a	week	do	you	use	any	of	the	following	media	to	inform	yourself	about	
current	political	affairs?	European	media	(Euronews	etc.)	…”	0/1/2/3/4/5/6/7	days	
education	 Individual		 “What	is	the	highest	level	of	education	you	have	successfully	completed?”	Recoded	into	
dummy	…	degree/no	degree	
standard	of	living	 Individual		 “Taking	everything	 into	account,	what	 level	 is	 your	 family's	 standard	of	 living?”	1=poor	
family/2/3/4/5/6/7=rich	family	
interest	in	EU	politics	 Individual		 “To	 what	 extent	 would	 you	 say	 you	 are	 interested	 in	 European	 politics	 …”	
Very/Somewhat/A	little/Not	at	all	
knowledge	about	EU	 Individual		 Based	on	knowledge	question:	 “Are	Switzerland	and	Croatia	members	of	 the	European	
Union?” Yes,	 both	 countries	 are/Only	 Switzerland	 is	 a	 member/Only	 Croatia	 is	 a	
member/Neither	is	a	member	
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lived	in	another	EU	country	 Individual		 “Have	you	lived	in	another	European	country	for	3	or	more	months?”	Yes/No	
EU	socialization	 Individual		 Additive	 scale	 combining	 answers	 to	 following	 questions:	 “In	 the	 last	 twelve	 months,	
have	you	done	any	of	 the	 following	 things?	Visited	another	European	country;	  Read	a	
book,	newspaper	or	magazine	in	a	language	other	than	your	mother	tongue;	  Socialised	
with	people	from	another	EU	country;	  Watched	TV	programs	 in	a	 language	other	than	
your	 mother	 tongue;	  Ordered	 or	 purchased	 a	 good	 or	 service	 online	 from	 another	
country	within	the	EU”	…	Yes/No	
trusts	EU	works	in	one's	interest	 Individual		 “For	each	of	 the	 following	 institutions,	please	tell	me	how	much	you	tend	to	trust	 it	 to	
work	in	your	interest?	 European	Union	…” A	lot/Somewhat/Very	little/Not	at	all	
Political	ideology	 Individual		 “In	political	matters	people	 talk	of	 the	 left	and	the	right.	What	 is	your	position?	Please	
indicate	your	views	using	any	number	on	a	scale	from	0	to	10,	where	0	means	left	and	10	
means	right”	
attachment	to	Europe! Individual		 “People	may	feel	different	degrees	of	attachment	to	places.	Please	tell	me	how	attached	
you	feel	to:	Europe…”	Very/Somewhat/Very	little/Not	at	all	
attributes	meaning	to	EU	citizenship	 Individual		 “Does	being	a	 ‘Citizen	of	the	European	Union’	mean	anything	for	you?”!Yes,	 it	means	a	
lot/Yes,	it	means	something/No,	it	does	not	mean	anything	
Europeans	share	common	heritage	 Individual		 “To	what	extent	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statement:	‘Europeans	share	a	common	
heritage	that	makes	them	closer	to	one	another,	more	close	than	Asians	to	one	another	
or	 South	 Americans	 to	 one	 another.’”	 Strongly	 agree/Agree/Neither	 agree	 nor	
disagree/Disagree/Strongly	disagree	
immigration	changed	country	(+)! Individual		 “Using	a	scale	from	0	to	10	where	0	means	‘makes	it	a	worse	place	to	live’	and	10	means	
‘makes	it	a	better	place	to	live’,	how	do	you	feel	{#country1}	has	changed	as	a	result	of	
people	from	other	countries	coming	to	live	here?”	
age	 Individual		 “What	year	were	you	born?”	
agricultural	sector	 Individual		 ”Are	 you	 or	 were	 you	 working	 in	 …	 Agriculture/State	 industry/Private	 industry/Public	
services/Private	services/Other”;	recoded	into	dummy	Agriculture/Other		
unemployment	 Regional		 Unemployment	rate,	2016	(Source:	Eurostat)	
Decentralization	 Regional		 Self-rule	index	(Source:	Hooghe	et	al.	(2016))	
EU	funds	absorption	rate	2007-13	 Regional		 2007-2013	Funds	Absorption	Rate	(Source:	European	Commission	(2017b))	
alloc0713pc	 Regional		 2017-2013	EU	Funds	allocations	per	capita	(Source:	European	Commission	(2017b))	
quality	of	government	2017	 Regional		 European	Quality	of	Government	Index	2017	(Source:	European	Commission	(2017a)		
Media	EU	valence	(log)	 Country		 Per	cent	of	news	stories	about	EU	Cohesion	Policy	with	positive	valence	(see	for	coding	
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Triga	and	 Vadratsikas	2018),	logged.	
Media	EU	civic	(log)	 Country		 Per	cent	of	news	stories	framing	the	EU	as	a	common	project	 (see	for	coding	Triga	and	 
Vadratsikas	2018),	logged.	
 
 
